neuroscience and neurobiology books

	Rapid Review Neuroscience (Rapid Review)
	By: James Weyhenmeyer, Eve A. Gallman ISBN: 0323022618 Publisher: Mosby Release Date: 15 November, 2006 Bioscience book rank: 144653
	Principles of Cognitive Neuroscience
	By: Dale Purves, Elizabeth M. Brannon, Roberto Cabeza, Scott A. Huettel, Kevin S. LaBar ISBN: 0878936947 Publisher: Sinauer Associates Inc Release Date: 05 November, 2007 Bioscience book rank: 220775
	Brain and Culture: Neurobiology, Ideology, and Social Change (Bradford Books)
	By: Bruce E. Wexler ISBN: 0262232480 Publisher: The MIT Press Release Date: 05 May, 2006 Bioscience book rank: 222021	The study of psychology has traveled down some interesting roads during the last century. After the long flirtation with the fascinating but flawed theories of psychoanalysis, a dominant theme became the idea that humans were no more than programmable robots. By way of a dozen detours, we then arrived at a new type of robot, one that was pre-programmed by his or her genes with environment contributing a little or a lot, depending upon our own beliefs about human nature. For that was always one of the problems: beliefs, biases and politics all played with the findings of psychology and neurology. For the totalitarian state, the idea that all people are born biologically equal and that, with the right prodding, they could be guided to be good citizens, became an article of faith in some parts of the world. Research, often only half understood, lead to grotesque attempts at social engineering. <br /> <br />Now the pendulum has swung again. Genes do not so much determine our behavior but influence our responses to the environment. During childhood our brains are incredibly plastic. The developing brain requires the right mix of nutrients, sensory, emotional and intellectual stimulation to realize its potential. The lion's share of higher cortical functions are dedicated to social functioning, and children first learn to develop in order to learn the social rules that help them to conform. During adolescence and early adulthood, this conformity is usually replaced by increasing individuality and drives to leave the parental nest. This leads to gradual attempts to shape the environment to fit with the structure of his or her brain and mind. Yet some plasticity remains throughout life, and we are likely able to create new neural connections and even new neurons into old age. And these new neurons and connections develop not only in response to the external environment, but also in response to our thoughts and emotions. <br /> <br />To these three findings - that genes predispose but do not determine; that our brains are malleable and plastic throughout life and third, the impact of our thoughts and beliefs on our brains - we can now add a fourth: the interplay of culture and society on our minds and genes, and the effects of our minds and genes on society. <br /> <br />This is one of a number of recent books that has begun to explore these important themes. Our genes lead - but do not force - us to create our world, and the world that we create has a powerful impact on the development of the next generation, who in turn create the world in their image. <br /> <br />Bruce Wexler is a Professor of Psychiatry at Yale and also directs the Neurocognitive Research Laboratory at the Connecticut Mental Health Center. He has been known for years as one of the most original and creative thinkers in his field. It shows in this book. It is just over 300 small pages and is crammed full of interesting ideas. The book is divided into two sections and five chapters: <br /> <br />Section I: Background: Some Basic Facts about the Human Brain <br />I. Transgenerational Shaping of Human Brain Function <br />2. Effects of Sensory Deprivation and Sensory Enrichment on Brain Structure and Function <br />3. Effects of the Social Environment on Brain Structure and Function <br /> <br />Section II. The Neurobiology of Ideology <br />4. Self-Preservation and the Difficulty of Change in Adulthood <br />5. The Meeting of Cultures <br />After which there is an Epilogue, References and an Index. <br /> <br />Bruce offers a neurologically based hypothesis that may go some way toward explaining some of the sectarian strife that has plagued so much of the world throughout history. He talks about the "neurobiology of ideology," to capture the process by which the human brain molds itself to its environment. Input from the world around us helps fashion our brains, and we in turn shape the world around us, which again shapes and changes the brain, leading to an endless dance between the brain, the mind and society. <br /> <br />This model helps to explain why it is that early life experiences can make it difficult to deal with unfamiliar events, emotions and situations later in life. But the argument also has a small hole in it. The author is an expert in human pathology, so he is interested in the way in which, say, "programming" in childhood may create problems later in life, as the individual encounters new challenges for which he or she is not prepared. As an example, if we think about an individual who was abused in childhood, he or she may have problems accepting and trusting a loving relationship as an adult. The disparity between the new environment and the developed brain may become a potent cause of distress and dysfunction. But that fails to answer another question: why do some people and some societies become distressed by novelty, while others delight in it? <br /> <br />This is an important, fascinating and thought provoking book that may provide answers to some of the problems that we see around us. We just need two more things: proof of his hypotheses and a way of using the model. That being said this work is already changing the way in which we see ourselves, not as the victims or beneficiaries of our genes, but as participants and co-creators of society and ourselves. <br /> <br />Highly recommended. I purchased Wexler's new book to further my understanding of the process thru which a person sheds obsolete religious beliefs -- such as those that were inculcated in childhood -- and then adapts present-day, non-theistic beliefs such as those described in my book "Concepts: A ProtoTheist Quest for Science-Minded Skeptics." I was hoping for a neurobiological elaboration of MD Faber's "The Psychological Roots of Religious Belief" (see my Amazon review of it) but I was only partially gratified. <br /> <br />After a brief description of the human brain, Wexler distinguishes two phases in the development of a person's brain (in my words, not his): In childhood the `seedling' neurons are searching out stimuli that `feed' their growth; what they obtain is how their brain gets `wired' ("our brain is what it eats"). As adults, this `wiring' not only influences what their brain looks for (gestalt) but how it interprets what it finds (projection); we try to reinforce what we learned as children and to adapt our environment to conform to our expectations. What doesn't conform to our mindset is routinely ignored or rejected. So as adults, one has to very deliberately maintain an open-mind to consider ideas that don't conform to one's early mindset, and the more the ideas stretch our mindset, the greater our tendency to reject them. Wexler elaborates extensively on this process citing research to back-up his contentions and examples of the consequences. <br /> <br />What Wexler doesn't elaborate to my satisfaction is how one overcomes the beliefs inculcated in childhood to achieve an unbiased understanding of today's world -- how one `rewires' their brain which can be an arduous process. Better yet would be ways of perpetuating the youthful growth of neurons into adult years to the extent possible (he alludes briefly to this on pages 242-3). He aptly describes immigrants' disorientation even as their children have an easier time adapting. And he describes how the loss of a spouse takes a year or so to accommodate. But he doesn't go into how today's media are affecting our openness to new ideas and other cultures. So I can recommend Wexler's book as a good introduction to the process but I'll have to keep looking for ways folks can let go of obsolete religious beliefs and replace them with an up-to-date ideology. <br /> <br />In Wexler's final chapter he discusses how indigenous and national cultures are being overwhelmed and extinguished by the global reach of the US's culture. But the rapid advances in today's technology are not entirely the doings of the US -- Europe, Japan, Australia and even India and China are encouraging this inevitable juggernaut (as he calls it) while Islamic cultures are resisting, often violently. To avoid violent confrontations he envisions a campus-like model (he's at Yale) where individuals can be exposed to unfamiliar cultures in least threatening ways. Wexler's book is well worth while but its overprice will discourage sales. <br />
	Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals about Morality
	By: Laurence Tancredi ISBN: 0521860016 Publisher: Cambridge University Press Release Date: 19 September, 2005 Bioscience book rank: 219117	Infinite variation is the theme behind Darwin's theory. We are all different and carry different traits. some people are colour blind. If morals are caused by inherited characteristics then what are we to say to people that make a claim that they are morally colour blind and therefore they are not responsible for their immoral actions? If Mr Hauser's theory is right it appears we are unable to hold these people responsible for their moral decisions. The praise-blame game goes out the window and also the whole concept of a justice system that holds people accountable for ther actions is now challenged, for it may be morally wrong to blame and hold people accountable for any moral action if moral actions are in any way determined by something that must be a part of their physical makeup. For this is the only conclusion possible if Mr Hauser is correct and there is something in all of us that determines the moral code of society. Therefore the conclusions of this book are morally unacceptable in the present moral climate. Trancredi provides an excellent example of the confusion that the therapeutic class inflicts on those it presumably tries to help. As a physician, he joins biologists in finally accepting that nature acts through nurture (although he cannot bring himself to say so in these words), not as two separately and distinctly antithetical influences that his field's pioneers have done for over a century. As a psychoanalyst, he still mistakes correlations for causation, and resorts to clusters of descriptive metaphysics as diagnostic of mental conditions. But the DSM-IV is the Bible of Mental Conditions that neurosis, affective, and psychotic disorders seem unable to describe. <br /> <br />As a theorist, he is surprising sloppy with language, confusing "delusion" for "illusion" -- an unforgiveble error by an expert who should know better. As an author he forgets to tell his readers what his subject is: "morality," the chief topic of his book. Never defined, nor outlined, nor described. And as one who ventures into philosophy's domain, he certainly is ill-equipped to integrate its criticisms of his field into his unscientific narrative. <br /> <br />The starkest defect is the failure to identify what Trancredi means by Morality. Morality is a Judeo-Christian concept, granted, with unsuccessful Enlightenment revisions (Kantian, utilitarian, benevolence). In philosophical literature, morality is proscriptive, deontological, universal, and objective norms of social behavior. In contrast, Ethics, which Trancredi never mentions, is prescriptive, teleological, situational, and subjective. <br /> <br />Dr. Trancredi might be surprised to learn that many axiologists deem "do no harm" to be the sole moral imperative, in which case, he never addresses the title his book presupposes. Disputes do arise among axiologists over whether "harm" to others and harm to self is a distinction worth making; Trancredi ignores it entirely. Ethics is not mentioned, which, given Trancredi's complete misinterpretation of Greek Classical Thought (Chap. 11) is probably to be desired. While ethics and morality are often conflated in and outside philosophical discourse, the omission of all ethical dimensions and failure to describe what Trancredi means by "morality" illustrates his total impoverishment of subject. <br /> <br />His first-two chapters are deliberately obfuscatory, which the specialist alone is likely to detect. The cover-up of Harvard's Marxist Biologist defending their messiahs rather than accept Darwinian biology has been exposed by sociologists that our author prefers to conceal (see, Segerstrale: Defenders of the Truth, OUP). Hardly his only concealment. But it is significant in that their other messiah, of course, was Freud, both of which Darwin completely undermines. Maybe that explains Trancredi's deliberate omission of "Darwinian Psychiatry" (OUP, 1998), while cherry-picking some of sociobiology's insights -- an otherwise significant work in the very field Trancredi claims some expertise. <br /> <br />Psychiatry, unlike its stepchild psychology, comes with a basic-science requisite, and psychotropics increasingly demand a biological explanation to be incorporated in its various hypotheses. As critics remind, which theory of psychiatry are patients to consider viable? psychoanalytic, sociocultural, behavioral, biomedical, chaos, transformative, Esalen, Eclectic theories-plus? No such theory from Trancrendi, only a thesis based on specious correlations. <br /> <br />As numerous critics have -- and continue -- to indict the Psyche gurus: it lacks a single, testable, coherent, and evidentiary-based theory, research, and demonstrable therapeutic modalities. But how else can SSRIs, Benzos, antipsychotics achieve Big Pharma dominance without a biomedical explanation? And in Trancrendi's able and elegant expository writing style with highly-selective biological, philosophical, and concealed subjects, he boasts psychiatry "starting in the last two decades of the twentieth-century, [has shown an] interest in biology and genetic of mental illness . . . [that] provokes another shift in focus from external ones to internal one arising from the biology of the afflicted person" (p. 146). Get those prescription pads out. Get those forensic psychotherapists defense stories readied. Get those Dr. Phil's and Dwyers into high gear with new solutions to the old problems. <br /> <br />Actually, Trancredi's solution is already known as the Twinkie Defense (1978), in which an all-American ex-cop assassinated his mayor and former colleague because he ingested too many Twinkies that caused his blood-sugar to drive him 15 miles back home, find and load a pistol, drive back 15 miles, crawl through City Hall's basement windows to escape public metal detectors and police scrutiny, and then unload his weapon in the mayor and supervisor of San Francisco. <br /> <br />If Trancredi's thesis is right, Dan White's Twinkie Defense was right, and we are wrong to hold a chemically-imbalanced murder to account for killing politicians. After all, White could not help himself, overloaded with sugar from too many Twinkies ingested the weeks before his murderous actions. The jury was right to convict him of voluntary manslaughter, not the more serious first-degree murder, sentencing him to five years in a minimum security facility to correct his chemical imbalance, not taking his life for the two he killed. And the WhiteNight Riots that erupted upon the jury's verdict in a rage of injustice apparently should have been dispensed benzodiazapines or major tranquilizers, rather than express rage and anger (or was that a chemical imbalance expressing itself in the masses?) <br /> <br />Not even the defendant Dan White bought into his own Twinkie Defense, much less the psychoanalysts' narrative of chemical imbalances as the "cause" of his murderous rampage. Instead, White put a gun to his own head, not for committing his murderous crime, but for the injustice of his psychoanalysts getting him off for murder with a mere five years in minimum security country club prison. <br /> <br />But if Trancredi's thesis is right, we should pity the assassin and beware of biochemical imbalances -- the new Psyche disorder that exonerates the guilty, counters personal responsibility, negates culpability, and anesthetizes the masses with Big Pharma's psychotropics or pays the Therapist his $165 hour. For What? Excuses? No. For the disregard of "morality," whatever "morality" might be -- once the therapeutic class determines what "morality" is from the philosophers. In the meantime, "chemical imbalance" worked for Dan White; Laurence Trancredi suggest a whole range of new Twinkie Defenses (at the forensic, not therapeutic, rate). <br /> <br />What a very different book and perspective Trancredi could have achieved with knowledge of Darwinian (evolutionary) psychiatry and emergent phenomena as complexity science reveals the brain-mind relationship. But then he'd have to call the "unconscious" into question, and despite no empirical evidence for such an entity, it is the root of all psychological explanations. <br /> <br />Tancredi projects that by 2100 the major mysteries of the brain will be solved. He presents what is known to date. Research points to a person's moral determinism seated in the composition of the brain. While biology holds sway, nurture has a role. Connections can be built or strengthened through experience, practice or learning. <br /> <br />The author illustrates this research with examples from his clinical practice. If the areas of the brain that supply the emotions of compassion and guilt cannot be accessed, other passions may rule unchecked. Risk takers do not store and/or access information on past consequences, those we call accident prone are fated to be so because they (chemically) cannot learn from past mistakes and criminals do not see the lines they are crossing. <br /> <br />In the future, will this science be used to absolve all guilt? When sources of addiction are uncovered will we have an addiction free society? Will the brain chemistry be altered for prevention and/or rehabilitation? Voluntarily? Involuntarily? <br /> <br />This book gives an overview of what science is finding in how the brain prescribes the moral lives of individuals. Hopefully a society will evolve a proper ethical framework to deal with it and can keep ahead of the science.
	Handbook of Functional Neuroimaging of Cognition, 2nd Edition (Cognitive Neuroscience)
	By: Roberto Cabeza, Alan Kingstone ISBN: 0262033445 Publisher: The MIT Press Release Date: 15 May, 2006 Bioscience book rank: 322872	This is an excellent book, focusing on fMRI and PET, that goes over in detail methodology and applications. The methodology sections includes details on the underlying physiology (it's more complicated than just blood flow and 02 extraction)and critiques the commonly used subtraction method, preferring instead event-evoked studies. Going beyond the simplistic concepts of areas "lighting up" being "for" this or that cognitive function, there is coverage of network analysis. The methodology is obviously still in an early evolutionary phase, and each chapter has closing section on controversies and future directions. The application sections cover neuroimaging of attention, visual recognition, semantic, episodic and working memory, and language. There is good critical review of the literature here, and there is no tendency towards oversimplification of conflicting results. There is also a chapter on cognitive aging that I found particularly informative, showing how the elderly utilize different neural networks than younger people to perform various cognitive tasks. The book is about 400 pages and includes 22 color plates. This is a very rich and rapidly evolving research area, and I think this is a great intro book for clinicians in neurology, psychology and psychiatry, as well as neuroradiology, to get an appreciation of what just a few years ago was a science fiction concept...taking pictures of the mind as it thinks.
	Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience
	By: M. R. Bennett, P. M. S. Hacker ISBN: 140510838X Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Release Date: 25 April, 2003 Bioscience book rank: 254185	This book is an anachronistic attempt to police the language used by neuroscientists. Don't waste your money. <br /> <br />While neuroscientists let data drive their models of the world, these authors, as is typical of those entranced by early 20th century Oxbridge navalgazing, get it backwards. They consider "our" (that is, their) concepts of mind and use these concepts to tell the neuroscientists how they should be modelling and talking about the brain. Scientists are world-focused, trying to understand the phenomena, while these authors are language-focused, and try to turn their armchair musings into prescriptions about how neuroscience should operate. Thankfully, this book has had, and will have, no effect on practicing neuroscientists. <br /> <br />One of their arguments, for instance, is that the term 'discrimination' is only appropriately applied to persons, that it is used to describe their behavioral dispositions. It is a mistake, these Quixotic language police aver, to import this language into the brain and describe brain processes as discriminating something. This is an inane argument. Let's say the authors are right that neuroscientists have extended the term 'discriminate' to something beyond which it originally applied. Big deal. Is it really helpful to arbitrarily sanctify certain linguistic conventions? You might as well say it is not appropriate to call something a computer because originally the word computer only applied to people like accountants who computed things for a living. I want to understand how the brain works, and I'm perfectly happy adapting preexisting words to do this. They need to go back to the drawing board and come back when they have something useful to say. <br /> <br />You will like this book only if you don't know anything about systems neuroscience, you like the linguocentric perspective of the analytic philosophers, and if you fetishize Wittgenstein (they use him as an authority in matters of linguistic overbearance). <br /> <br />The best thing about this book is its title, which is actually a misnomer. If you want to learn about the conceptual foundations of neuroscience, read a neuroscience text like Kandel and Schwartz (Principles of Neural Science), Purves (Neuroscience), or Kristoph Koch (Biophysics of Computation). <br /> <br />I give it two stars rather than one because it is such a clear example of philosophy that is completely irrelevant. I would never recommend that someone spend money on it. I concur with the reviews below. I would also like to advise reading Peter Munz's "Critique of Impure Reason" and "Beyond Wittgenstein's Poker" as prerequisites or complements to this book. <br /> <br />In addition, I would like to underscore the kind of practical guidance this book has to offer. For example, on page 134 (paperback), the authors state-- <br /> <br />"We are not suggesting that these considerations settle the a priori question of whether colours (and other secondary qualities) are objective qualities of objects or subjective modifications of our sensibility. The arguments are complex and ramified. [footnote here] What we are suggesting is that cognitive neuroscientists should not adopt a non-scientific, metaphysical doctrine of questionable philosophical ancestry, which is supported by philosophical arguments of questionable validity. This recommendation is by no means trivial, since the seventeenth-century conception of reality, of what is objective and what is subjective, of the nature of perception and its objects, has profoundly affected the ways in which brain scientists currently conceive of their investigations. This particular philosophical doctrine is not necessary for coherent, successful neuroscientific investigation, and neuroscientists' reports of the results of their investigations would benefit, not suffer, from bypassing this contentious conceptual matter." <br /> <br />If you would prefer bypassing the futile attempt to conduct twenty-first century research using seventeeth-century metaphysics, then you will appreciate this kind of guidance. <br /> <br />And the book is a treasure trove rich with examples of this kind of sage and practical guidance. disclaimer: I am writing this as a philosopher of mind so any parts of the book or chapters not related to this are not what I am addressing. <br /> <br />I do not mean to say that Bennett and Hacker have all the answers, but their "ordinary language" approach, along with their debt to Wittgenstein, Ryle, Kenny and Strawson, says something about their book. Most contemporary philosophers of mind (Sprague, Strawson and Hacker, among others, excluded) have rightly dismissed the soul, but have decided that there is something "mysterious" about consciousness, or perception or emotion, or what have you. In response, Bennett and Hacker have shown what "consciousness" really is: the conscious acts of people existing in the world. This is why we know that other people are conscious actors: they do conscious things such as watch birds, or play chess, or eat ham sandwiches. <br /> <br />If Michael Tye's or David Chalmers' or Colin McGinn's problems of consiousness (e.g. that I can know that you feel the same pain that I feel, or that you see the same color that I see) are indeed problems for you, you should read this book; if it doesn't prove to you that they are not problems at all, at least it will give you a new way of looking at the problems so that you may come to your own interesting conclusions.
	The Cognitive Neuroscience of Music
	By: Isabelle Peretz, Robert J. Zatorre ISBN: 0198525206 Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA Release Date: 02 October, 2003 Bioscience book rank: 254710	The collection of articles in this book gives a fascinating overview of human musical cognition and how it is modeled computationally. It also addresses the effect of brain lesions or abnormalities on musical competence and abilities, and thus gives the reader a taste of the kind of research that is being done in current research circles in the cognitive neuroscience of music. It is readily apparent after reading the articles that much is known about musical cognition, but there are many questions yet to answer. Because of space constraints, only a few of the articles will be reviewed here. <br /> <br />When considering human musical ability and competence it is natural to ask whether it is the result of evolutionary adaptations or whether it is "accidental" or "evolutionary vestige." The article by David Huron discusses these questions in some detail, with emphasis on the ability of evolution to shape not only physiological attributes and functions, but also human attitudes, emotions, cognitive abilities, and so on. The author gives an overview of the `nonadaptive pleasure seeking' (NAPS) view of music, and also the view that music is indeed an evolutionary vestige. He concludes, interestingly, that the truth of NAPS would place music lovers at an evolutionary disadvantage. If music is an evolutionary vestige, it still is important to ask, says the author, what value it had in the past for human survival. He discusses various types of evidence for supporting an evolutionary origin for music, such as genetic, neurological, ethological, and archaeological. Noting that no genes have been discovered which are correlated with musical ability, the other types of evidence do add plausibility to his evolutionary hypothesis, he argues at length in the article. The ability of music to form social bonds he believes shows the greatest promise as a plausible evolutionary origin for music. Most interesting is his discussion of how music brings about social bonding, with the hormone oxytocin playing a major role in this regard. <br /> <br /> The article by Stephen McAdams and Daniel Matzkin on the perception of musical similarity is interesting for its own sake but also from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. Measures of similarity and to what extent a given concept can be changed and still be judged or perceived to be in the same category are of great interest in artificial intelligence. The authors of this article argue that the empirical evidence in similarity perception limits the `transformation space' for given music material. In other words, one can only go so far in the transformation of the original musical material before it is judged as completely new. The authors discuss in detail the factors that contribute to these limitations. In this context, the authors discuss a very interesting experiment to test among other things whether professional musicians are able to hear similarity to a greater degree of transformation if the transformations respect certain syntactical rules. The authors conclude, and their conclusions adhere to what is expected based on listening experiences, that the space of possible variations of musical material that is perpetually similar to an original piece of music is very limited. <br /> <br /> Neural networks naturally enter into any discussion on human cognition, and they do so here in the article by Barbara Tillman, Jamshed Bharucha, and Emmanuel Bigand, who use them to model music cognition. Simulation of mental processes is of immense importance in brain research and allows one to study the effect of various anatomical and physiological abnormalities on cognition. The authors mention these capabilities in their article, but their emphasis is on explaining how neural networks coupled with unsupervised learning, can be used to model music cognition. They also mention, but do not discuss in any detail, the use of self-organizing maps to simulate the neural plasticity that allows the capacity to extract regularities and to then become sensitive to musical structures and regularities. <br /> <br /> The article by John Brust discusses the effect of neurological disorders on musical function. The author discusses `musicogenic seizures', which are triggered by the hearing of music. Interestingly, these seizures can be triggered in some people by merely listening to their own voice. In some individuals, sound can also produce the perception of colors. This is called `synesthesia' by the author, but he does not discuss it in any great length. Apparently synesthesia is poorly understood, but has been noted to happen very frequently in individuals using hallucinogenic drugs. Also discussed is `amusia" which is an acquired impairments of musical processing. <br /> <br /> The next article by Isabelle Peretz continues the discussion on amusia, but the emphasis is on what it reveals about brain specialization for music. The author holds that music has neuroanatomical specialization, in that there is a collection of neural networks that are dedicated to the processing of music. The author discusses various patients who had accidents causing brain damage in certain areas of the brain but were still able to retain musical skill. This occurred even when the damage occurred in the part of the brain responsible for language abilities. Even more surprising is that the auditory recognition of music is supported by cognitive processes that are not used at all in speech recognition or in environmental sound recognition. The author also discusses musical savants and the phenomenon of tone deafness. In terms of neural networks, the author asserts that brain specialization for music involves the encoding of pitch along musical scales and the ability to impute a regular beat to incoming events. She believes though that further research is needed to show that neural networks that are domain specific for music are the result of evolutionary adaptation.
	The American Psychiatric Publishing Textbook of Neuropsychiatry and Behavioral Neurosciences, Fifth Edition (American Psychiatric Press Textbook of Neuropsychiatry)
	By: Stuart C. Yudofsky, Robert E. Hales ISBN: 1585622397 Publisher: American Psychiatric Publishing, Inc. Release Date: 21 September, 2007 Bioscience book rank: 141060	StuartYudofsky,M.D.and Robert Hales,M.D.'s ambitious project of bringing the exciting and dramatically evolving disciplines of biologic psychiatry and behavioral neurology has been rendered magnificently both in breadth and depth in the assiduously crafted and edited fifth edition of the APP Textbook of Neuropsychiatry and Behavioral Neurosciences. The textbook has been thoughtfully edited and produced so that clinicians from various disciplines can locate source material pertaining either to broad neurobehavioral disorders or to more specific behavioral-psychiatric symptoms. Whereas many textbooks that ambitiously attempt to cover both the neuroscience as well as clinical aspects of neurological disorders are uneven in there coverage and clarity, Yudofsky and Hales have done a masterful job of giving an in depth though succinct neuroscience background that informs the clinical and therapeutic discussions making this textbook the single most authoritative and clinically comprehensive text dealing with the behavioral neuroscience. <br />I am a neurological consultant at a traumatic brain injury unit and on receiving my copy( the text,figures and diagrams being first rate!)I carefully read Jonathan Silver, et.al chapter on the Neuropsychiatric Aspects of Traumatic Brain Injury which in addition to being superbly written gave a wealth of practical approaches and recommendations which were of value both to patients and their families as well as members of the multidisciplinary team. Those involved in teaching will find Harel, and Tranel's Functional Neuroanatomy: Neuropsychological Correlates of Cortical and Subcortical Damage and Ovsiew's Bedside Neuropsychiatry: Eliciting the Clinical Phenomena of Neuropsychiatric Illness having done the hard work of sifting through the voluminous literature to present a remarkably succinct and thorough discussion. With the APP making all figures and diagrams expertly rendered in CD-ROM format you are ready for lift off in giving well informed presentations <br />Without reservation I would recommend this textbook to anyone interested in getting a bird's eye view of the exciting developments and their clinical application in the behavioral neurosciences. It is must reading for those interested in training and certification in neuropsychiatry/behavioral neurology. For a one reach resource it is the best buy (actually in light of its extensive and cutting edge coverage a bargain)for consulting neurologist, psychiatrist, neuropsychologist, cognitive- behavioral therapist.
	Biophysics of Computation: Information Processing in Single Neurons (Computational Neuroscience)
	By: Christof Koch ISBN: 0195181999 Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA Release Date: 28 October, 2004 Bioscience book rank: 378645	Koch's book is a tour de force - a chocolate box of biophysics with coatings of equations and melting illustrative centers. I dip into it whenever I want a sharply phrased insight, or hunger for a fact. I have only 2 quibbles. The book is unfortunately too good - the brilliance lavished on it would perhaps have been even better deployed in a frontal attack on the real problem in the biophysics of single neuron computation: understanding how neurons can "learn" the subtle and complex higher-order correlations in their inputs. And the account of the core issue - how single synapses can be both electrically coupled to the distant spike-initiating zone (perhaps 1 mm away) and yet chemically isolated from other synapses that are less than a micron away - is oversimplified and leans too heavily on the author's own somewhat naive analyses. Koch is a genius who risks frittering away his energies on impressing his (grateful and appreciative) audience, rather than pulling the Excalibur of Mind from the Rock of Matter. This is the main book, the "Bible", on single neuron and ion channel computational modeling. Plenty of theory & rigor here! Professor Koch, with CalTech, models single ion channel function, dendrite, dendrite tree function, cable theory, stocastic theories, integrate-fire model, the Poisson model, and discusses how single neurons work together inside the brain. It is worth owning both as a reference book and to use in the laboratory. Dr. Koch has written many other books, but I think this stands out as his best. Methods in Neuronal Modeling 2nd edition is also very good. Koch's writings are complementary, but are not redundant. One can read this book without a problem if you know Calculus. For young scientists who are interested in understanding the dynamics of the human brain this change in collective attitude is of profound significance, to which Koch's book provides an ideal introduction.Written in a precise yet easy style, the 21 chapters of Biophysics of Computation begin at the beginning, introducing the reader to elementary electrical properties of membrane patches, linear cable theory and the properties of passive dendritic trees. These introductory chapters are followed by two on the properties of synapses and the various ways that synapses can interact to perform logic on passive dendritic trees. Then the Hodgkin-Huxley formulation for impulse propagation on a single fibre is discussed in detail, and various simplifying models are presented. As a basis for the Hodgkin-Huxley description the present<br>understanding of ionic channels is reviewed, emphasizing the importance of calcium currents. Further chapters discuss linearization of the H-H equations for small amplitude behavior; present a careful examination of ionic diffusion processes; and describe electrochemical properties of dendritic spines, synaptic plasticity, simple neural models, stochastic neural models and the properties of bursting cells. Just about every facet of currently available neural knowledge is touched upon, with appropriate references to a carefully selected bibliography that will help the diligent novice delve deeply into whatever aspect of neural information processing he or she chooses.<p>All of the above comprises an extended introduction to Chapters 17 to 19, which: `synthesize the previously learned lessons into a complete account of the events occurring in realistic dendritic trees with all of their attendant nonlinearities'. `We will see', the author writes, `that dendrites can indeed be very powerful, nontraditional computational devices, implementing a number of continuous operations.' Thus Biophysics of Computation offers a definitive statement for the direction in which the neural research of the new century should go. Chapter 20, the penultimate, discusses several speculations for non-neural computation in the brain, ranging from molecular computing below the level of a single neuron to the effects of chemical diffusants (nitric oxide, calcium ions, carbon monoxide, etc.) on large numbers of neurons. Although this entire area has been neglected by most of the neuroscience community, Koch points out that there are no good reasons for doing so. As we enter the new century, neuroscientists should keep their minds open. Finally, in the summary of Chapter 21, seven problems for future research projects are listed, emphasizing that the investigation of information processing in single neurons is very much a work in progress. It is of interest to examine these `strategic questions' as they reveal the author's intuitions about possible directions of future developments. (Note that these are not direct quotes, as I have taken the liberty of summarizing Koch's questions.)<p>(1) How can the operation of multiplication be implemented at the level of a single neuron?<br>(2) What are the sources of noise in a neural system and how does this noise influence the logical operation of a single neuron?<br>(3) How is the style of neural computation influenced by metabolic considerations?<br>(4) What is the function of the apical dendrite, which is a typical cortical structure?<br>(5) How and where does learning actually take place in a neural system?<br>(6) What are the functions of the dendritic trees, the forms of which vary so widely from neuron to neuron?<br>(7) How can we construct neural models that are sufficiently realistic to capture the essential functions of real neurons yet simple enough to allow large-scale computations of brain dynamics?<p>As these questions indicate, Koch is not merely concerned with understanding<br>what unusual behaviours the neuron does or might exhibit. His broad aim is to comprehend the relation between this behavioural ability and the computational tasks that the neuron is called upon to perform. In his words:<p>``Thinking about brain style computation requires a certain frame of mind, related to but distinctly different from that of the biophysicist. For instance, how should we think of a chemical synapse? In terms of complicated pre- and post-synaptic elements? Ionic channels? Calcium binding proteins? Or as a non-reciprocal and stochastic switching device that transmits a binary signal rapidly between two neurons and remembers its history of usage? The answer is that we must be concerned with both aspects, with biophysics as well as computation.''<p>This excellent book is evidently a labour of love, stemming from the author's 1982 doctoral thesis on information processing in dendritic trees. As far as I can tell all relevant aspects of neural processing are considered, with what seem to me to be just the proper amounts of emphasis. The writing style is precise and rigorous without being stuffy, and the many references to a fifty-page bibliography will be of enormous value to young researchers starting out in this field.<p>In addition to its obvious value for those engaged in experimental, theoretical or numerical studies of neuronal behaviour Biophysics of Computation would also work well as the text for an introductory course in neural dynamics, perhaps as part of a neuroscience program. <p>Alwyn Scott<br>http://personal.riverusers.com/~rover/
	Relational Processes and DSM-V: Neuroscience, Assessment, Prevention, and Treatment
	By: Steven R. H. Beach, Marianne Z. Wamboldt, Nadine J. Kaslow, Richard E. Heyman, Michael B. First, Lynn G. Underwood, David Reiss ISBN: 1585622389 Publisher: American Psychiatric Publishing Release Date: 10 June, 2006 Bioscience book rank: 205615